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WAIVER OF INDICTMENT IN FELONY CASES*
Charles S. Pottst
r SHOULD be noted in the beginning that it is not here pro-
posed to abolish the grand jury. Most, if not all, writers treating
the subject agree that there are situations in which tile inquisi-
torial powers of the grand jury are very useful. Especially is
this true in cases involving criminal conspiracies and violations of
law by one or more public officials, or "court-house rings." What
is proposed and will here be discussed is the abrogation of the re-
quirement, formerly found in most constitutions, state and Fed-
eral, that no crime of felony grade could be tried except upon
indictment of a grand jury.
Bearing this limitation in mind we may point out that three
or four hundred years ago this venerable institution, the Grand
Jury, endeared itself to our English ancestors by serving as a check
on the exercise of arbitrary power by kings and overlords.' Before
the royal or baronial court could take jurisdiction of a case, this
body of freemen, operating in secret, had to "present" the accused
or find a "true bill" a.ainst him. In the same way the Amcrican
colonists were protected in their lives and property against arbi-
trary actions by the king or by his royal governors.
It is not at all surprising, therefore, that when the American
Revolution came, the fathers wrote into their state and national
constitutions the provision that no person should be tried for a
capital or otherwise infamous crime except upon presentment or
indictment of a grand jury. But with the secure establishment of
free governments in this country and in England a century and
a half ago, the danger of arbitrary trials by subservient judges
*The author has been assisted in the preparation of this article by a grant from the
Carnegie Foundation for the Advanccmcnt of Teaching.'
tDean Emeritus, School of Law, Southern Methodist University.
ICriminal Justice in Cleveland (The Cleveland Crime Survey), p. 210-212 (1922).
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steadily diminished, and men began to ask themselves whether
the grand jury, after all, was as essential to liberty as it had been
in earlier times. Many reached the conclusion that it was no longer
necessary to provide a constitutional safeguard against despotic
sovereigns and their servile ministers, and that the constitutional
provision requiring indictment in all felony cases could safely
be omitted from the constitutions of our newer states. Not only so,
but several of the older states joined the movement and without
changing their constitutions, have provided by law that the defend-
ant may waive the right to be indicted by the grand jury, and
consent to be tried on an information filed by a prosecuting at-
torney.3
So general has this movement become that it can now be stated
that Texas is the only state west of the Mississippi River that
still requires an indictment by a grand jury before a felony can
be tried. East of the River the following states do not require
an indictment in all felony cases: Connecticut, Florida, Indiana,
Michigan, New York, and Vermont. In addition nine states east
of the River allow the defendant to insist on a grand jury indict-
ment, or, in the alternative, permit him to waive indictment by the
grand jury and be tried on an information, filed by the prosecut-
ing attorney. These states are Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Mas-
sachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island and Virginia.
2 Justin Miller, Information or Indictment in Felony Cases, 8 MINN. L REv., 379-408
(1923-24). This article was reprinted in full with extensive notes, in 8 J. AMEn. Jun.
Soc., 104-120 (1924). [The author, then Professor of Law at the Univ. of Minn., later
served as Dean of the Law School of the University of Southern California, then as Dean
of the Law School of Duke University, and still later as Associate Justice of the Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia. He is now President of the Association of Amer-
ican Broadcasters, New York.] See also Dession, From Indictment to Information--
Implication of the Shift, 42 YALE L J. 162-193 (1932); and the Report of the Commis-
sion on L. Observance and Enforcement ("The Wickersham Commission") No. 4, pp.
124-126 (1931) ; Moley, The Initiation of Criminal Prosecutions by Indictment or Infor.
mation, 29 MtcH. L. REv. 403 (1931); Moley, The Use of the Information in Criminal
Cases, 17 A. B. A. J. 292 (1931).
8 OFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 212-218 (1947) ; Johnson,
Waiver of Indictment in Texas, 1 Tax. LAW AND LEcISLATION 22-23, and note 23, p. 27
(1947) ; FEDERAL RuLES OF CIM. PRO. (1946) Rules 7a and 7b.
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1. THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE STEPS OUT
In 1930, the American Law Institute gave impetus to the move-
ment by providing in Section 113 of its Model Code that all of-
fenses of whatever grade may be prosecuted either upon indict-
ment or information.4 Section 114 of this Code relieved the judge
of the necessity of impaneling a grand jury at each term of
court. It reads as follows:
"Section 114. When grand jury to be summoned. No grand jury shall
be summoned to attend at any court except upon the order of a judge
thereof when in his opinion public interest so demands, except that a
grand jury shall be summoned at least once a year in each county.",
2. MICHIGAN'S EXPERIMENT: THE ONE-MAN GRAND JURY
While the State of Michigan has not abolished the grand jury,
it rarely calls one, but has developed a very interesting substi-
tute for it. In 1917 the Legislature passed an act providing that
whenever it was deemed necessary a single district judge or magis-
trate might sit as a "one-man grand jury," calling witnesses, taking
testimony, and formulating charges to be tried before the jury,
in lieu of an indictment. As at first drawn the statute permitted
the judge who conducted the preliminary hearing to preside at the
trial before the jury, but this objectionable feature was eliminated
in 1947, and now a different judge must preside.
The Michigan statute providing for the so-called one-man jury
reads as follows:
"Whenever by reason of the filing of any complaint, which may be
upon information and belief, any justice of the peace, police judge or
judge of a court of record shall have probable cause to suspect that any
crime, offense, misdemeanor or violation of any city ordinance shall
have been committed within his jurisdiction, and that any person may
be able to give any material evidence respecting such offense, such jus-
4 For State and Federal provisions relating to the instituting of Criminal proceed-
ings, see Am. L INsTrTrres CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCwMurw, Chap. 4, pp. 414.431.
5 For State and Federal provisions relating to Grand Juries, see Am. L Isrmrs s
Cooz OF Cram. PRO., pp. 431-434.
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tice or judge in his discretion may, and upon the application of the
prosecuting attorney, or city attorney in the case of suspected violation
of city ordinances, shall require such person to attend before him as a
witness and answer such questions as such justice or judge may require
concerning any violation of the law about which he may be ques-
tioned....
"Any witness neglecting or refusing to appear in response to summons,
or to answer any questions which such justice or judge may require
material to such inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of contempt and shall
be punished by a fine not exceeding one hundred (100) dollars or im-
prisonment in the county jail not exceeding sixty (60) days, or both in
the discretion of the court: Provided, that if such witness after being so
sentenced shall appear and answer such question, the justice or judge
may in his discretion commute or suspend the further execution of such
sentence."6
After the foregoing paragraphs were written, word comes that
the Legislature has "nullified" Michigan's one-man grand jury
law, by requiring that three judges act together hereafter in order-
ing and conducting preliminary examinations. As a result, one
legislator is quoted as saying that,
"[tihe hundreds of minor inquiries that have so greatly aided the
work of prosecutors will hereafter, in one-judge circuits, seldom be
possible, and for greater inquiries, it will be difficult to assemble
three judges from various circuits for an inquiry that may last for
months. When such a grand jury is assembled, much will be lacking
in efficiency, speed, economy and determination through diffusion
of authority and responsibility and handicaps on initiative, and
through inevitable conflicts of several personalities....
6 Waite, Michigan's "One-Man Grand Jury" Before the Supreme Court, 31 J. AM.
JtD. Soc. 184-186 (1948). The case there referred to, In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948),
does not question the right of the State of Michigan to confer inquisitorial powers on itsjudges and magistrates, but holds that such judge-grand jury cannot hold a witness
guilty of contempt in failing or refusing to answer questions, without affording him a
public hearing and the assistance of counsel.
For other articles dealing with the one-man grand jury see the following: March,
One Man Grand Jury, 8 J. Am. JuD. Soc., 121 (1924) ; Unprecedented Success in Crim-
inal Courts, 26 J. AM. Jun. Soc., 42-44 (1942) ; Id. at 79-80; Winters, The Michigan One-
Man Grand Jury, 28 J. Am. Jun. Soc., 137 (1945); Gallagher, The One-Man Grand
Jury--a Reply, 29 J. AM. JUD. Soc., 20 (1945).
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"The attorney-general and prosecuting attorneys are to be barred
from appointment to other office.
"Through an unintended blunder in drafting, the new law will
require every justice of the peace to refer to a circuit judge every
criminal complaint."'
In line with this criticism is the recent report of a special com-
mittee of the State Bar of Michigan which reads in part as
follows:
"For 32 years the grand jury law has stood as a protecting shield be-
tween the law abiding people of Michigan and those who would com-
mit any crime from murder to violation of public trust by graft,
bribery and corruption....
"The majority of the members of the Special Committee of the State Bar
of Michigan believe that a grave mistake was made in enacting House
Enrolled Bill No. 287. We believe it emasculates and destroys the pro-
tection of the grand jury law. When the people of Michigan fully realize
that they have been stripped of this protection in the field of law en-
forcement, we believe that they will restore the one-man grand jury
system."8
3. FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The federal courts are the latest recruits to this impressive array
of jurdisdictions that no longer require an indictment in the prose-
cution of ordinary felony cases. The new Federal Rules of
Criminal Procdure that became effective on March 21, 1946, pro-
vide that a defendant in a felony case may waive indictment and
be tried upon information filed by the United States Attorney, ex-
cept in capital cases. The following is the language of Federal
Rules 7(a) and 7(b).
"7 (a) Use of Indictment or Information. An offense which may be
punished by death shall be prosecuted by indictment. An offense
which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
733 J. Am. JuD. Soc., 58-59 (Aug. 1949).
7a "Special Committee to Study and Report upon the One-Man Grand Jury Law,"
28 MICHIGAN STATE BAR JOURNAL, 63 at 74 (1949). The report was signed by 11 out
of 14 members of the committee. It provoked a bitter debate in the State Bar meeting,
and the action of the Legislature was disapproved by a very narrow margin.
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year or at hard labor shall be prosecuted by indictment, or, if indict-
ment is waived, it may be prosecuted by information. Any other
offense may be prosecuted by indictment or by information. An
information may be without leave of court.
"7 (b) Waiver ol Indictment. An offense which may be punished
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year or at hard labor
may be prosecuted by information if the defendant, after he has
been advised of the nature of the charge and of his rights, waives
in open court prosecution by indictment."
In the notes to Rule 7(b) prepared under the direction of the
Advisory Committee appointed by the Supreme Court, occurs the
following pertinent statements:
1. "Opportunity to waive indictment and to consent to prosecution
by information will be a substantial aid to defendants, especially
those who, because of inability to give bail, are incarcerated pending
action of the grand jury, but desire to plead guilty. This rule is par-
ticularly important in those districts in which considerable intervals
occur between sessions of the grand jury. In many districts where
the grand jury meets infrequently a defendant unable to give bail
and desiring to plead guilty is compelled to spend many days, and
sometimes many weeks, and even months, in jail before he can begin
the service of his sentence, whatever it may be, awaiting the action
of a grand jury. Homer Cummings, 29 A.B.A. Jour. 654-655; Van-
berbilt, 29 A.B.A. Jour. 376, 377; Robinson, 27 Jour. of the Am
Judicature Soc. 38, 45; Medalie, 4 Lawyers Guild R. (3) 1, 3. The
rule contains safeguards against improvident waivers.
2. "On the constitutionality of this rule, see United States v. Gill,
55 F.(2d) 399 (D.N.M.), holding that the constitutional guaranty
of indictment by grand jury may be waived by defendant. It has also
been held that other constitutional guaranties may be waived by the
defendant, e.g., Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (trial by jury) ;
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (right of counsel); Trono v.
United States, 199 U.S. 521, 534 (protection against double jeop-
ardy); United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (privilege
against self-incrimination); Diaz v. United States, 223 U. S. 442,
450 (right of confrontation).'
s For comment while the proposal to adopt Rule 7b was still pending, see the fol-
lowing: Fm. W. Barron, Chief of Indictment Section, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice: 2 Fed. Rules Dec., 211, 214 (1943) ; also 5 Fed. Rules Dec., 150-155, at 152
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4. ENGLAND ABOLISHES THE GRAND JURY
If the grand jury has fared badly in America, it has fared much
worse in England, the land of its birth. After a hundred years of
debate, participated in by such outstanding men as Jeremy Bent-
ham, Lord Denman, Lord Parmoor, Lord Salisbury and the three
legal historians, Pollock, Maitland and Holdsworth, Parliament
took the first step toward actual abolition of the grand jury by
passing an act on April 2, 1917, the "Grand Jury Suspension
Act."9 This act abolished the use of the grand jury for the duration
of the war. It remained in full force and effect until abrogated by
an order in council near the end of the year, 1921.
With the suspension of the Suspension Act the long debate in the
press and Parliament was resumed, but it was quite clear that the
end was near. In December, 1932, the Lord Chancellor, Viscount
Sankey, appointed a committee to consider the business of the
courts. In February, 1933, the committee brought in an interim
report recommending the abolition of grand juries. Almost with-
out debate the act was passed and went into effect September 1,
1933.1" The only exception it made was to permit grand juries to
be held in the County of London and the County of Middlesex for
consideration of treason and other high crimes against the govern-
ment, and charges preferred against the governors of overseas
dominions.
Section 2 of the Act allows private persons to file charges, which
upon approval by officers of the court become indictments triable
(1946) ; Judge Alexander Holtzofl, 3 Fed. Rules Dec., 445.458, at 449 (1944) ; Advisory
Commission on Rules Criminal Procedure, 4 Fed. Rules Dec., 405-445, at 410-412 (1946).
See also Annual Reports of Attorneys General: Reports for 1931, p. 3 and 1932,
p. 6, by Attorney General Mitchell; Reports for 1933, p. 1, 1936, p. 2, 1937, p. 11, and
1938, p. 14, by Attorney General Cummings; Report 1939, 7 and 11 by Attorney General
Murphy.
See also Report of Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Judges, 1941, 13, recom-
mending that "existing law or established procedure be so changed that a defendant may
waive indictment and plead to an information filed by a United States Attorney in all
except capital felonies," quoted in 4 Fed. Rules Dec., 411 (1946).
9 7 Geo. 5, C. 4 (The Law Reports, 1917-18, p. 3).
10 23 and 24 Geo. 5, C. 36; 26 Halsbury's Laws, 80. For an interesting discussion,
see Elliff, Notes on the Abolition ol the English Grand Jury, 29 J. Ci. L. & Cam., 3-22
(May-June, 1938).
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by a jury in the ordinary way," much as private persons in Texas
may file complaints before a magistrate or prosecuting attorney.
It should be noted in passing that the grand jury has never been
used on the continent of Europe, except in France from 1791 to
1808. Nor has it been used in the overseas colonies of the conti-
nental nations. Even in Canada, the following provinces do not
have the grand jury: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Que-
bec, 2 and Saskatchewan.
5. OBJECTIONS TO REQUIRING INDICTMENT IN ALL FELONY CASES
What then are the defects of the present system of requiring
indictment by a grand jury in all felony cases?
a. Delay. It is one of the chief causes for delay in criminal
trials. If the grand jury is not in session when an offense is com-
mitted, the case must wait until the next term of court, unless the
crime be one so shocking or so important as to warrant the Dis-
trict Judge, if the court is in session, in re-assembling the grand
jury after it has been discharged for the term. This waiting for
the next term of court may mean a delay of as much as six months,
a period of time amply sufficient in any adequate system of crimi-
nal administration to cover all steps between the arrest of the
offender and the final disposition of his case by an appellate court.
In other words, in such a case we are only ready to begin investi-
gating whether to prefer formal charges against him at a time
when the accused should be at large after an acquittal, or on
his way to the gallows or to the penitentiary if convicted.
b. Injury to the State's case. The delay while waiting for the
grand jury often results in the returning of no "true bill," as a
result of the disappearance of witnesses, the fading of memories,
and in some cases no doubt by the improper influencing of wit-
nesses by the accused or his friends. In most instances, two or
three such delays are almost as good as an acquittal.
II See Sec. 1 (4) and "Schedules" at end of act.
12 Quebec abolished the grand jury in 1933, following the example of England, and
of the four western provinces of Canada. Surveyor, The Judicial System of Quebec,
27 J. AM. JUo. Soc., 21 at 24 (1943).
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c. Many Escape Indictment. The grand jury fails to indict many
persons who should be indicted. A study made by the Illinois
Association for Criminal Justice showed that "not a true bill" is
returned in about 22 per cent of the cases bound over by the
examining magistrate to await the action of the grand jury. The
report compares the results reached in Chicago with those obtained
in the neighboring city of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where the grand
jury is rarely used. In Chicago, of every 100 persons charged with
felony a total of fifty-seven are eliminated for "want of prosecu-
tion" or other cause, or are discharged after the preliminary hear-
ing, leaving only forty-three out of the hundred who are held to
await the action of the grand jury. Of the forty-three persons
bound over,1 3 nine are not "billed" by the grand jury,"' leaving
only thirty-four to be docketed in the trial courts out of every 100
persons charged. In Milwaukee, on the other hand, out of each 100
persons charged only seventeen are eliminated by the preliminary
processes. As none are eliminated by the grand jury (the grand
jury being rarely called) and as informations are filed in all
cases not eliminated in the preliminary proceedings, eighty-three
out of each hundred originally charged are docketed in the trial
courts as against only thirty-four out of each hundred in Chicago.
"But," some one may say, "possibly many of those tried in
Milwaukee should have been eliminated by the grand jury." Pos-
sibly so, but the results of the trials on the merits do not seem to
sustain such an objection, for the report states that "the final per-
centage of convictions is much larger than in Illinois."A little
under 50% of those tried by the jury are convicted in Chicago,
as against 76.94%c in Milwaukee.1"
Doubtless these figures account in large measure for Chicago's
unenviable record of crime. The surveyors clearly placed an ap-
13 Illinois Crime Survey, Table A.4, p. 38 (1929).
14 Id., Table A-5, p. 41. In 1949, R. A. Hall, Criminal District Judge of Dallas
County, reported that 35 per cent of the cases considered by the Grand Jury were no-
billed-a poorer record than that of Chicago's grand juries. Dallas News, April 2, § II,
p. 6.
5 Id., Table A-6, p. 43.
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preciable share of the responsibility upon the constitutional re-
quirement in Illinois that no felony can be tried except upon pre-
sentment of a grand jury-
The same conclusion was reached by the American Judicature
Society, one of the greatest organizations of judges, prosecutors,
lawyers, law teachers, and criminologists in the history of this
country. This body recently stated that "in 999 out of ever 1,000
cases the grand jury can not possibly do anything to further the
rights and interests of the State. If its action is anything more than
a nullity, a mere waste of time and effort, it is certain to be prej-
udicial to the prosecution."
d. Little Protection to the Accused. If the grand jury is prejudi-
cial to the prosecution, it is of little or no value as a protection to
the legitimate rights of the accused. Its proceedings are secret, the
accused can not be present to explain, to confront and cross-exam-
ine witnesses, or to introduce witnesses in his own behalf. It is a
star chamber proceeding that by presenting formal charges can
blacken a man's name in a way that acquittal before a trial jury
can never entirely efface.
In the system herein proposed every person accused of a felony
has an examining trial before a magistrate immediately after
arrest; in this he can face his accusers, can have the help of coun-
sel, can confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him,
and can have compulsory process for securing witnesses in his be-
half. If no sufficient showing is made against him, he is discharged
at once without the stigma of having been indicted or tried. If a
sufficient showing is made he is bound over for a public trial be-
fore judge and jury, but not to await the result of a star-chamber
proceeding at which none of the immemorial rights enumerated
above are granted to him.
To add an ex parte secret investigation before the grand jury,
to the open hearing already had before the magistrate, is not to
provide protection for the innocent person accused of crime, but
is to furnish another loop hole for the guilty, to produce delays,
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to clog the machinery of justice, and finally to escape the punish-
ment they deserve.
e. Burden on Witnesses. The proceedings before the grand jury
are largely a matter of rubber-stamping the opinion of the Dis-
trict Attorney, but they add materially to the burden of the state's
witnesses. These witnesses are required to be present at the exam-
ining trial, unless it be waived; to tell the whole story a second
time before the grand jury; to tell it once again in the trial before
the jury and possibly a fourth time should the conviction be re-
versed on appeal. It all adds up to a wearisome, time-consuming
burden that should be made as light on the citizen as is consistent
with the proper administration of justice. Citizens shun service as
a witness whenever possible. So much so that in day-time gang
murders witnessed by hundreds of people, it has been found almost
impossible to find any one who will admit that he knows anything
about it.
f. An Expensive Luxury. The grand jury, except for its inquisi-
torial function in conspiracy cases, is an expensive luxury- Former
District Attorney Banton of New York stated that in 4,000 cases
out of 6,000 presented to the grand jury, that body's efforts were
a complete waste of manpower and entirely unnecessary.
In 1924, the Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence presented to
the Texas Bar Association an able report, prepared and read by
the chairman of the committee, the Hon. Jed C. Adams of Dallas,
an experienced lawyer and former District Attorney, advocating
the abolition of the requirement that all felonies be tried upon
presentment by a grand jury."6 The report contains figures com-
piled by the auditor of Dallas County showing that the grand jury
of that day cost the county about $20,000.00 per year, and the
people of Texas an estimated total of half a million dollars per
year. It is considerably larger than that at the present time. If this
expenditure were necessary to protect the rights of the State or the
16 Report of the Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure, Texas Law Rev., Bar
Assn. Number 1924, pp. 128-146, at p. 132. Auditor Charles A. Tosch of Dallas County
gives the cost of the grand jury for Dallas County for the year 1948, at approximately
$25,000, or an increase since 1924 of a little more than 25 per cent.
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rights of persons accused of crime, we should willingly bear the
burden, but not when most of the money goes to perpetuate an out-
worn institution of earlier ages.
6. WAIVING INDICTMENT IN TEXAS
Apparently there is no serious question that the legislature can
constitutionally authorize a person accused of felony to waive
indictment of a grand jury and be tried on an information filed
by the prosecuting attorney. The language of the Constitution of
Texas is substantially the same as that of the Fifth Amendment of
the Federal Constilutio t7 attd as we have elsewhere pointed out
the Supreme Court of the United States, through its rule making
power, has recognized that an accused person may waive his right
to be tried on an indictment, and can consent to be tried on an
information filed by a prosecuting attorney. If the requirements of
the Fifth Amendment can be satisfied by the making of a rule-
Federal Rule 7(b) quoted above-it would seem to follow that the
requirements of the Texas Constitution can equally be met by a
statute permitting the defendant in a felony case to waive indict-
ment and consent to trial on an information. If no constitutional
change was necessary in the one case, none would be necessary in
the other.
Such a result was reached in a Massachusetts case decided in
1943. It is true that Article 12 of the Massachusetts Constitution
differs in verbiage from either the Federal or the Texas Constitu-
17 The Fifth Amendment on this point reads as follows:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger."
Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of Texas is as follows:
"No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense, unless on an
indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is by fine
or imprisonment, otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment,
in cases arising in the army or navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger."
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tion, but the meaning and purpose are the same. The court in its
opinion says:
"We are of the opinion that the provisions of Art. 12 of our Bill
of Rights, which have been held to mean that a presentment by the
grand jury is required where a person is accused of a felony, like the
provisions for a jury trial, were intended to secure a benefit to the
individual for his protection and security, and that the privilege
therein asserted may be waived.... We find nothing in that docu-
ment that declares or manifests an intention to deprive the individ-
ual of power to refuse to assert his constitutional right to a present-
ment by a grand jury.' s
In this connection it may be well to call attention to the fact that
both Federal and state courts have upheld the right of accused
persons to waive many of the rights granted to them by constitu-
tional and statutory provisions, including the right to trial by jury
in felony cases; 19 protection against self incrimination;2" guaranty
of a speedy trial;21 the right to be confronted by the witnesses
against him;2  against double jeopardy;"3 and the right to be repre-
sented by counsel.24 If all these rights granted or guaranteed to
accused persons by constitutions and statutes may be waived by the
accused, there would seem to be no reason to doubt that an accused
person can be allowed to waive the right in felony cases to be
tried upon indictment by a grand jury.
Indeed, it would seem that for almost a hundred years our
statutes have authorized the waiver of indictment. Our original
Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted in 1856, in Article 26, made
1s DeGolyer v. Commonwealth, 314 Mass. 626, 51 N. E. (2d) 251 (1943). See also
United States v. Gill (Dist. Ct. N. Mex.), 55 F. (2d) 399 (1931).
19 Patton v. U. S., 281 U. S. 276 (1930) ; Tex. C. C. Pro. Art. 11, as amended in
1931, 42nd Leg., p. 65, ch. 43, sec. 2; McMillan v. State, 122 T. Cr. R. 583, 57 S. W.
(2d) 125 (1933).
20 Powers v. U. S., 223 U. S. 303 (1912).
21 Daniels v. U. S., 17 F. (2d) 339 (1927).
22 Diaz v. U. S., 223 U. S. 442 (1911).
23 Levin v. U. S., 5 F. (2d) 598 (1925).
24 Adams v. U. S. ex rel McCann, 317 U. S. 269, 605 (1942) ; McKee v. State, 118
T. Cr. R. 497, 42 S. W. (2d) 77 (1931).
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the following provision for the defendant to waive his rights in
criminal cases.
"Art. 26. The defendant to a criminal prosecution for any offence may
waive any right secured to him by law, except the right of trial by jury
when he has pleaded not guilty."
This provision has remained in the code from that day to this,
and now appears as Article 11, the exception now being appli-
cable to trial by jury in felony cases only. And even this exception
was modified in 1931, by an act permitting the defendant in a
felony case in which he proposes to lead guilty to waive trial by
jury. This statute permitting trial by jury to be waived, is em-
bodied in Article 12, and has been fully sustained by the Court
of Criminal Appeals.25
It is believed, therefore, that a simple statute in lieu of Article
11, allowing the defendant to waive indictment, and instructing
the prosecuting attorneys and trial courts to accept such waiver
by any defendant and to proceed to trial on the prosecutor's in-
formation, would be upheld as constitutional. Such a change would
be of great benefit to incarcerated persons, and, by speeding up
the work of the courts and reducing costs, would be beneficial to
the public at large.
25 McMiUan v. State, 122 T. Cr. 583, 57 S. W. (2d) 125 (1933).
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